

~~SECRET~~ ~~INFORMATION~~

COPY NO. 14

PSB D-47

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 20, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: AGENCY LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT: Status Report of the Psychological Strategy Board
to the National Security Council

Attached hereto are copies of Working Draft No. 2 of the two sections of the Status Report of the Psychological Strategy Board to the National Security Council, namely, "Summary of Significant Psychological Activities" and the "Work of PSB".

A meeting has been called at 708 Jackson Place, N. W., for Thursday, July 23, at 2:30 p. m. to consider these drafts together with the individual reports of the member departments and agencies.

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Secretary to the Board

Enclosures:

PSB D-47, July 20, 1953

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I. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of the status of our national psychological programs as of June 30, 1953, based on the appended Progress Reports by the departments and agencies responsible for operations.

GENERAL

2. While the President's Committee on International Information Activities studied the whole problem of the world struggle with a view to basic improvements, ^{in the U.S. position} the ~~actual conduct~~ ^{conduct} of that struggle, on the psychological as on other fronts, was ~~renewed~~ ^{increased} vigor. The most far-reaching opportunity came with Stalin's death. The President's speech of April 16 was signally successful in capitalizing on the situation by appealing to the new leaders for an era of worldwide peace and friendship. The world at large received the speech with great enthusiasm, and the follow-up support through psychological exploitation added to the initial success.

3. Further exploitation of events behind the Iron Curtain has been guided by the requirement that psychological operations must be keyed in with political action. After Stalin's death, the next major occasion for such action followed the outbreaks in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Plans and operations were stepped up accordingly, with prospect of conducting a major campaign in the long-range contest to take full advantage of the consequences of Stalin's death.

4. Outside of the Soviet orbit the developments on the psychological front have been characterized by a disappointing deterioration in the attitudes towards the U.S. Non-Communist press and public opinion in Western Europe has reflected mounting criticism of U.S. foreign policy

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(the possible trend back to isolationism), ~~administrative~~ and alleged anti-Communist "hysteria." These unfavorable attitudes in combination with a generally more receptive reaction among Western European peoples to the Soviet "peace offensive" now constitute an intensification of anti-American feeling among significant elements of European opinion.

5. World opinion has also been markedly unfavorable towards the development of U.S. foreign trade policies. At the same time that we are sharply reducing our programs for economic assistance, it has felt that we are providing little indication that our markets are to be opened up to foreign goods. Congressional criticism of our allies for their practices in the field of East-West trade, in combination with the new Soviet line on expansion of trade with the free world, has begun to have an adverse psychological impact around the world.

6. The invasion of Laos and the accompanying threat to Thailand signaled a new phase of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Urgent planning for stronger psychological measures based on Thailand was set in motion ^{as the result} to help meet this threat.

the threat of Communist aggression in SE Asia *of the invasion of Laos and* *have been*
7. While our overt psychological capabilities were severely reduced by personnel difficulties, pressures in the Congress and appropriations cuts, covert capabilities continued to make sound progress, and faster and more energetic teamwork was secured through closer relations with the NSC and the operating agencies.

AREAS

The Soviet Orbit

8. Within the USSR itself, radio still constitutes the only important means used currently to reach the Russian people. Jamming by the Russian radio of our broadcasts continues to present a major problem. There was

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however, a perceptible increase in effectiveness ^{25X1C} [REDACTED] in the last six months due to the inauguration of [REDACTED] and the stepped-up activity of [REDACTED]. In addition to the radio, leaflet distribution was utilized to reach Soviet military forces stationed outside the USSR.

25X1C 9. Similarly, in Communist China, the major psychological activities ^{approaches} ~~maintain~~

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

11. In most of the ^{se} Satellite States, progress in other forms of psychological activity, mainly unattributable, has been slow, and has centered on the build-up of operating potential. There has, ^{particularly in} however, been increased action, including leaflet drops, ^{over} in certain satellites - notably Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania.

12. Access to East Germany, ~~on the contrary~~, was ~~fully~~ maintained despite increasing Soviet security restriction. Virtually the entire area has been continuously subjected to ^{U.S.} our psychological programs through mainly indigenous channels.

13. In Western Europe, the maintenance of U. S. Armed Forces within and around the area, combined with the U. S. Military Aid program for helping the NATO nations to build up their own defenses, provided the major positive

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psychological impact contributing effectively toward achieving our objective of building up confidence, stability, and strength in the West to deter Soviet aggression. Increased emphasis on troop acceptance programs enlisting the positive cooperation of the governments and the local authorities has brought about a definite improvement in most areas in the problem of avoiding friction between U. S. military personnel and foreign populations. The central problem that has confronted our psychological efforts in Western Europe during the past six months - and especially since Stalin's death - has been the Soviet "Peace Offensive". It is evident that many, if not all, Western European governments have been influenced to some extent by the Kremlin's tension-reducing tactics. The general public in most Western European countries has been ~~even~~ more strongly influenced than their governments by the Soviet peace bait. The effect has been to slow ^{down} progress toward a number of our objectives, including the build-up of Western defenses, the ratification of EDC, and attainment of European integration.

14. The U. S. counter-offensive has included fullest exploitation by the Department of State's Information Program of the President's Inaugural address and of his April 16 speech challenging the new leaders of the USSR to prove their peaceful professions by deeds, not words. Copies of the latter were presented to Foreign Offices all over the world in advance of delivery and kinescopes of the entire speech were sent to seventy-three posts within a day of its delivery. One of these was shown over BBC television on April 20 to an estimated audience of 6,000,000. Five million pamphlets, handbills, and leaflets on the speech were prepared and distributed, and a documentary film of it in thirty-five languages had been produced and shipped by May 2.

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in cooperation with the director



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16. In France, the municipal elections in May showed that the Communists had suffered a slight set back in rural areas, but had ~~fully~~ maintained their ^{strength} ~~position~~ in the industrial areas in larger cities. Governmental instability was a troublesome factor during the period and a relaxation of earlier French official measures to reduce the power of the Communist Party in France resulted. The repercussions of some Congressional investigations, as well as of the Rosenberg executions, in conjunction with the Kremlin's peace campaign, appear to have contributed to an increase in neutralism.

17. In the United Kingdom also, there appears to have been a marked increase in neutralism in its special British form of Bevanism. Although the belief is still widely held that Western unity must be preserved, three major elements contribute to the growth of anti-American feeling:

- (1) The belief that the present U. S. ~~Administration~~ is deeply divided on basic international policies,
- (2) The development of the Soviet "peace offensive", and
- (3) The desire to exercise a more positive and independent initiative in international affairs.

18. In West Germany and Berlin, the recent riots touched off greatly increased pressures for unification, complicating the problems of German ratification of the EDC. With this exception, however, 25X1C10b
25X1C10b

Germany, appear to have been fairly effective in promoting progress toward our major goal of a Democratic Germany integrated into Western defense efforts. Since late March German press opinion has reflected a decline in confidence in U. S. leadership. This was temporarily halted by the President's April 16 speech, but has since been resumed. The two major factors

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contributing to this are: (1) the Soviet "peace offensive" and (2) lack of agreement ^{within the} among U. S. ~~leaders~~ on policy towards Germany.

19. In the Near and Middle East and South Asia, neutralism, and the tendency to associate the U.S. with "colonialism", continued to present a major obstacle to the attainment of our psychological objectives. In the Arab States, ~~our~~ ^{on the part of the U.S.} alleged pro-Israel bias remained a major handicap, although the visits to Middle Eastern capitals by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Stassen may have alleviated this problem, at least temporarily. IIA has continuously exploited the beneficial aspects of these visits in its output to the area. Turkey, Pakistan, and Greece appear to be the brightest spots in this area, psychologically speaking.

20. The invasion of Laos and the accompanying threat to Thailand signaled a new phase of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. But the outlook in the area remained critical.

21. In the Far East, the resumption of Korean truce talks raised major psychological problems. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners

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necessitated special measures to deal with "brain washing". Steps were taken to achieve more effectively coordinated guidance on information Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. matters concerning Korea through the channels of the/ The offer of a reward to MIG pilot defectors was / produced by an immediate and significant shift in communist air tactics over the Korean battle area.

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23. In Latin America, our capabilities for effective psychological action increased in a number of countries, mainly in the field of un-attributable activity. There has been growing dissatisfaction in many Latin American countries directed ^{for the most part} ~~mainly~~ against American economic policies. To help offset this, ~~a major psychological move was the departure of~~ ^{departed} Dr. Milton Eisenhower, on a goodwill tour of South America late in June.

25X1C 24. Special Items

25. A grant of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan has had a similarly favorable effect.

26. ^{Carefully planned} Exploitation of U. S. leadership in the atomic field, with a coordinated public information program on the Nevada weapons tests and other special weapons, as well as certain news leaks that gave rise to widespread speculation as to the explosion of a thermo-nuclear device at Eniwetok atoll, ^{contributed} ~~important elements~~ to the U. S. psychological effort.

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II. THE WORK OF PSB

During the first half of 1953, the work of PSB was marked by a vigorous shift in emphasis from long-range planning to include more immediate implementation and operational activities. This change reflected the advent of a new Administration, and especially the assumption of the Presidency by General Eisenhower. The ~~new~~ President's ~~world~~ stature made his inauguration on January 20 a major factor in the world psychological struggle, doubly so because of the strong views which he was known to hold on the importance of seizing the initiative in the cold war.

This found direct expression in the designation of Mr. C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant to the President, and his appointment, along with Harold E. Stassen, new Director of the Mutual Security Agency, to membership on the Psychological Strategy Board. Mr. Jackson was elected Chairman of the Board.

MAJOR ACTIVITIES

The impact of these organizational changes on the work of PSB was further heightened by important psychological developments in the international field during this period, including the death of Stalin, the intensified "peace offensive" of the successor regime in the Kremlin, the renewal of armistice negotiations in Korea, and the outbreak of large-scale anti-communist and anti-Soviet rioting in East Germany.

A number of special projects were undertaken by PSB as a result of these events and changes, some at the request of the National Security Council, others on the initiative of the new Chairman of the Board.

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
These special projects included the following major staff activities:

Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power
(PSB D-24)

Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death (PSB D-40)

During the early months of the reporting period, preparatory planning in anticipation of Stalin's eventual death continued under PSB D-24, including the drafting of a contingency guidance. When Stalin's illness was reported, the National Security Council requested the preparation of a plan for psychological exploitation of Stalin's death (NSC Action No. 728 b.(3), March 4, 1953). The resulting PSB D-40, "Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death", was finally approved on April 23, superseding PSB D-24. The Presidential address of April 16 was the major initial move provided for in the Plan. Such an address had been agreed upon by the NSC, and PSB was assigned the task of coordinating appropriate follow-up by departments and agencies of the Government (NSC Action No. 734 d, March 12, 1953). To assist it in complying with this assignment, as well as in implementation of PSB D-40, the Board established a working group which reports twice monthly to the Chairman.

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
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Interim U.S. Psychological Plan for Exploitation of Unrest in Satellite Europe (PSB D-45)

NSC Action No. 817-e (June 18) directed PSB to prepare recommendations as to policies and actions to exploit the unrest in the satellite states. A summary statement of the recommendations was approved by the Board on June 24, and by the NSC on June 25. The comments of the member agencies on the complete plan (PSB D-45) were coordinated through normal staff procedures and approved by the Board on July 1. This plan provides for an integrated and phased exploitation of actual and latent unrest in the satellite states to embarrass Soviet Control in those areas without jeopardizing fundamental American objectives.

U. S. Psychological Strategy with Respect to the Thai Peoples of SEA (PSB D-23)


Shortly after the Viet Minh invasion of Laos, the NSC directed the PSB (NSC Action 788 b. 13 May) to develop a plan for coordinated psychological operations  and to submit this plan to the NSC for consideration.

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Korea

Emergency Plan - Break Off of Korean
Armistice Negotiations (PSB J-19-d)

This contingency plan provides psychological objectives and courses of action in the event of the breakdown or break off of armistice negotiations. It was originally approved in the autumn of 1951, and was reviewed ~~recently~~ , along with supporting plans and guidances prepared by the Departments of Defense, State and by CIA. Both the basic and the supporting plans were found to be adequate and timely, and a recommendation that they not be rewritten was concurred in by the departments and agency concerned.

Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations (PSB D-7c)

When a ^{Korean} cease-fire seemed likely, this contingency plan was reviewed. Although prepared in 1951, it was found that this program and the more recent supporting plans accompanying it provided adequate guidance. This plan covers the period immediately following the conclusion of an armistice and the Department of State has already begun work on the preparation of a new guidance dealing with the period of UN General Assembly approval of the proposed armistice agreement and the opening of a Korean political conference.

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Guidance on Prisoner of War Exchange in Korea

At the request of the Department of Defense, the PSB Staff undertook to prepare a coordinated interdepartmental guidance on the POW problem in Korea and in particular on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. This guidance was submitted to the Chairman of the PSB and transmitted by him to the members of the Board as a checklist of relevant psychological considerations.

Communist Brainwashing

As a result of a letter of February 19 from the Secretary of Defense to the Under Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence and of subsequent conversations between the last-named and the PSB staff, an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee was set up to work with various scientific advisers to ascertain what counter-measures can be undertaken against so-called communist "brain-washing" techniques. A member of the PSB staff, who chaired the committee, remains in close contact with the military officers in charge of repatriation of the first American prisoners of war, and he has certain continuing responsibilities in connection with the foreign and domestic psychological aspects of the problem.

U. S. Doctrinal Program, PSB D-33

In September 1951, the Board authorized the establishment of an interdepartmental panel to study and make recommendations about "doctrinal (ideological) warfare against the USSR." At that time, the Board approved a paper which noted the Soviet ideological efforts which had gained influence upon the intelligentsia throughout the world and had predisposed them towards communist viewpoints. The panel, studying the Soviet approach and possible U. S. counter-action, developed a U. S. Doctrinal Program (PSB D-33) as a means of restoring U. S. influence and minimizing

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communist influence among the world's intellectuals. This Doctrinal Program visualizes a long-term intellectual movement, employing a permanent literature and a series of scholarly activities to break down the doctrinaire thought patterns which have aided Communism and to foster greater understanding and acceptance for the traditions and viewpoints of America and the Free World. As of June 30, the proposed program had been circulated for Board approval.

President's Emergency Immigration Program

On April 22, 1953, President Eisenhower recommended to the Congress emergency legislation to admit 240,000 immigrants into the U. S. during the next two years. The President indicated the categories of people to be covered were escapees from Communism and the victims of economic conditions in the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On the initiative of the Chairman of PSB, members of its staff intensively supported this recommendation by assistance in the preparation of legislation to be introduced into Congress and by other means necessary to bring about its enactment. This was a completely coordinated staff effort, bearing in mind the potential impact of the program on the Italian General Elections which were to occur on June 7th and 8th, the objectives outlined

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in PSB's Escapee Program, and the possibilities such legislation would have in helping to bring about greater solidarity within NATO. The PSB Coordinating Committee for D-15b was able to make particularly good use of the introduction of the bill in the Senate and the introductory statement by Senator Watkins as well as of the supporting testimony of Cabinet members.

The PSB staff has continued its assistance on this project and should the legislation pass, which appeared highly probable at the end of the reporting period, a special effort is planned to exploit it further at the time the President signs the bill.

Armaments Publicity Policy

A member of the PSB staff is representing Mr. C. D. Jackson in the deliberations of an Ad Hoc Committee on Armaments and American Policy. This group was designated by the NSC Planning Board in March to develop a Government publicity policy for the benefit of the American public on the subject of the armaments race with the USSR.

On May 8 an Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee (NSC 151) went to the Council which considered it on May 27, and its action on that date included a direction to the PSB

"...to prepare for Council consideration an outline plan of the specific steps, including speeches by Government officials, which should be taken to carry out the recommendations contained in NSC 151."

A Presidential speech was in draft at the end of the reporting period, to be finalized by the Special Assistant to the President in cooperation with his PSB representative on the Ad Hoc Committee and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

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Procedural Guidance for Famine Relief Projects

A PSB staff paper setting forth an operational plan for exploitation of possible psychological advantages which might be derived from gifts of U. S. surplus food to countries within the Soviet orbit was submitted for Board consideration.


President's Flood Relief Committee

A PSB staff member served in an advisory capacity on the Inter-Agency Working Group on Flood Relief.

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

The increased emphasis on special projects and short-term plans of a quasi-operational nature, as well as the maturing of more and more long-range PSB plans, led to a sharp increase in the follow-up work of PSB in collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the MSA. In addition to coordination activity on plans and projects described above, the following approved PSB plans were in the process of active implementation by government departments and agencies during the reporting period:

Plans now being Implemented



Coordination of the implementation of these two plans has been carried out by a Washington Interdepartmental Committee working with

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
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Municipal elections held throughout France in May indicated a slight over-all decline in communist electoral strength, but future prospects for effective anti-communist action were not bright as the reporting period closed with a prolonged French political crisis. Efforts started some months ago to lift parliamentary immunity from six communist deputies have not yet been successful.

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(c) Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit
Escapes (FSB D-18/a)

The Escapee Program was established in implementation of U. S. defector policy as set forth in NSC 86/1 with respect to improving the conditions of reception and care afforded recent escapees from Communism,

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and promoting their permanent resettlement. The Program which was administered by the Department of State during the reporting period also provides opportunity for meeting and confuting, with evidences of friendship and practical concern for the victims of Communism, the damaging Soviet propaganda which has in the past exploited inadequate conditions and the general neglect which greeted escapees on their arrival in the Free World.

During the past six months, the Program has achieved substantial results at a minimum cost to the Government. In Europe, care and maintenance activities are carried on in each of the major countries of first asylum, benefiting 14,890 currently registered escapees through the provision of supplemental food, clothing, medical and dental care, sanitary and living facilities, and amenity supplies. Resettlement is promoted by documentation, training, counseling and similar services performed in Europe, immigration opportunity searches undertaken in Canada and several Latin American countries, and the provision of funds for transportation for escapees qualifying for movement. Through these methods 4,709 escapees had been resettled or were awaiting passage by June 1, 1953.

United States assistance has directly brought about a marked improvement in the conditions of asylum and opportunities for resettlement offered escapees, and has also stimulated increased contributions by local government authorities and voluntary agencies. These activities have afforded material for utilization through information media abroad, have contributed to intelligence acquisition and related programs, and have provided a basis for successful rebuttal in the General Assembly of Czechoslovak charges of subversion under the Mutual Security Act.

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
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Soviet and satellite sensitivity to the propaganda effectiveness of the fact of continued escape from behind the Iron Curtain, and of assistance to this group on the part of the Free World has been demonstrated by repeated press and radio attacks on the Escapee Program, by internal propaganda designed to conceal or minimize the continuing outward flow, by increasingly severe security measures and border controls, by the bringing of charges before the General Assembly, and by legal measures directed at particular individuals and groups of emigrés.

During the year, program activities were extended under the authority of Section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, on a limited basis to South Asia and the Far East. Some 300 Kazakh refugees from Sinkiang Province who escaped to Kashmir are being assisted

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- (d) National Psychological Program with Respect to
Escapees from the Soviet Orbit: Phase "B"
(PSB D-18a/1a)

Approved by the Board on January 15, 1953, this Plan is essentially a program for encouragement of escape from the Soviet orbit for psychological purposes and for psychological employment of key satellite personnel.

On the recommendation of the Board, the NSC amended NSC 86/1 to insure that the term "key satellite personnel" includes any satellite national whose escape would be of significant psychological value to the Free World. An observer from the staff of PSB has been designated to meet, as the agenda requires, with the Inter-Agency Defector Committee

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which functions under CIA to execute NSCID 13 and 14. Plan D-18a/1a provides for military use of escapees to derive psychological advantages. Incisive action in this regard resulted from appointment of a special committee by the NSC at the direction of the President. This task group, carrying forward the work of the Phase "B" panel, made a comprehensive

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- (e) Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations
During General Hostilities (PSB D-8/b, NSC 127/1)

The substance of this Plan has been integrated into the current war plans of both JCS and CIA. The Department of State chairs an inter-departmental committee of representatives from State, Defense, and other agencies concerned for the purpose of working regularly on an "X-Day" Plan in implementation of NSC 127/1.

- (f) National Overt Propaganda Policy Guidance for
General War (PSB D-11/b)

The substance of this Plan has also been integrated into the current war plans of JCS and CIA. The State Department feels that the Plan

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
itself will serve as an adequate guide for its purposes should general hostilities break out.

- (g) A Strategic Concept for a National Psychological Program with Particular Reference to Cold War Operations under NSC 10/5 (PSB D-31)

Work on this project was in effect taken over by the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

- (h) National Psychological Strategy with Respect to Germany (PSB D-21)

and



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generally, as well as of modifications in U. S. policies.

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(k) Psychological Strategy Program for the
Middle East (PSB D-22)

Implementation of this Plan is proceeding under the active supervision of the Middle East Coordinating Panel in Washington. After the visit of the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Director of NSA, to the Middle East, the Panel held a special meeting toward the end of the reporting period to take into account the resultant new policy attitudes toward Middle Eastern problems. A request for comments on D-22 from the field resulted in replies from five of the ten Diplomatic Missions in the area. The comments received were uniformly favorable and several of them were enthusiastic. The Washington Panel is considering the problem of establishing in the field the necessary coordinating mechanism to implement this regional program.

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(e) Indo-China

A special program for the use of U. S. Influence in Support of U. S. Objectives in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was drafted and in the process of interdepartmental clearance at the end of June.

(f) Psychological Strategies in North Africa

This paper, including a study of the Psychological Data, a report on the Status of Power Relations, and an illustrative plan for U. S. psychological action in the area, was in the process of clearance and completion on June 30.

Studies in Preparation for Future Plans

Continuing the emphasis on psychological action directed at the Soviet orbit, a staff study has been undertaken on the manipulation of communist scientific requirements as a communications channel preliminary to the development of a plan. Research has also been undertaken to discover the major Soviet sensitivities in the psychological field as a preliminary to determining the basic underlying Propaganda Themes for U. S. propaganda.

A staff study on "Africa, South of the Sahara" has been drafted with preliminary analysis on the major factors which must be considered in the development of any psychological plan for this area. Staff studies on Iberia and North Africa have been continued on a low priority basis. Several functional studies are in preliminary stages of development. Among them is a study of the role of religious and moral forces in the struggle against Communism, and a study on the use of the U.N. as a forum and sounding board for attacks on the Soviet communist philosophy.

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Review and Revision of Approved Plans

A procedure was developed during the period, under which all completed plans are regularly reviewed by the staff with a view to determining whether revision is required. Early revision of the French and Italian plans is now contemplated.

EVALUATION AND INTELLIGENCE

Evaluation Methods

Work was continued with Government research offices engaged in developing techniques for evaluating psychological operations. Progress in this field has been made through:

- a. examining current evaluation research projects in the Government to determine their relevance to PSB needs.
- b. alerting Government research units (e.g., the RDB Advisory Group, HumRRRO, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (Army), the Human Resources Research Institute (Army)) to the continuing need for research, particularly on evaluation criteria for psychological operations, and assisting them in fixing priorities for major research projects.
- c. holding conferences on evaluation techniques and criteria (e.g., with the Evaluation Branch of OGPW, with CIA, and at the Fort Bragg Psywar Center).
- d. suggesting specific evaluation projects for Government research units, such as a Handbook on Statistics for Psywar, which was taken up with OCFW.

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
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
e. Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Escapees (PSB D-18a):

An analytical report on the first year's operation of the United States Escapee Program is nearing completion.

f. Soviet Sensitivities: An evaluative report on this subject, prepared in an interdepartmental committee, was completed and submitted to the Acting Director for approval and interdepartmental circulation for information as a staff study. It recommends that OIR 6164 on this subject, which resulted from the work of the committee, be periodically reviewed for the sake of maximum operational exploitation of the sensitivities.

g. A review of the psychological situation and related factors in Yugoslavia involved the assembly of basic intelligence and strategic considerations, for possible use in planning.

h. The Malenkov Test Case: Before the death of Stalin and in conjunction with PSB D-24 an extensive review of classified and other data on Malenkov was completed. It was decided that



i. Latin America: A pre-planning estimate of the psychological situation in this region was nearing completion at the end of the reporting period.

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Intelligence Support

Staff members continued to work in liaison with the intelligence-producing agencies of the Government to provide intelligence support and guidance to the Board and the Staff. This function includes selecting from, and, in some cases, synthesizing the output of the agencies, arranging for new research where necessary, and setting up staff briefings by experts from outside the staff.

In this period, similar services were also developed to meet the needs of the Chairman of the Board for Government intelligence on such psychological subjects as foreign opinion trends, and international reactions to particular programs, actions, and statements of the United States Government or its officials. This mission for the Chairman has required a greater emphasis upon the rapid procurement and processing of current intelligence from the agencies on a daily basis.

Psychological Support for USUN

As a result of discussions between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. C. D. Jackson, and subsequent PSB action at the informal meeting of June 3, a PSB-chaired committee of the member agencies was established to organize an anti-communist psychological campaign focussed upon the General Assembly scheduled to convene on the 15th of September. At the close of the reporting period, the committee was in action and early documentation had been supplied to Ambassador Lodge.

Utilization of Research for Psychological Operations

During this period, significant progress has been made in establishing close ties with appropriate research offices by:

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- a. providing research personnel with indoctrination on FSB objectives through discussion groups and individual meetings.
- b. assisting the Advisory Group of the Research and Development Board on their survey of research goals and needs for psychological and unconventional warfare.
- c. recommending the establishment of a committee to evaluate the contributions made by government-subsidized research studies to the conduct of psychological and unconventional activities and operations. Their recommendation has been accepted by OPP/OSD and will be carried out by the Advisory Group of RDB.

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